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Intuitive Solutions in Game Representations:




We show that any transferable utility game can be represented by an as-
signment of facilities to the players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to
allocate the total cost of the facilities. The intuitive solution in the represen-
tation turns out to be the Shapley value of the game, and thus serves as an
alternative justification of the value.
Key Words: TU game, characteristic function, Shapley value, assign-
ment, representation.
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1 Introduction
We show that any characteristic function v on player set N (also known as a
transferable-utility, or TU, game on N) can be “represented”by an assignment of
(i) facilities that each player needs to use;
(ii) cost/benefit of each facility.
Moreover, in this representation, all those who use any given facility are identical
there1 (in that the same facility suffi ces for any number of its users, with no alteration
∗It is a pleasure to thank John Geanakoplos, Ori Haimanko, Abraham Neyman and Shyam
Sunder for helpful comments. (In particular, Shyam helped me to come up with the title.)
†Stony Brook Center for Game Theory; and Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale
University
1Since we are considering a representation, the more special its features, the better. However,
our assumption that users are identical vis-a-vis any given facility, is without loss of generality.
As was already shown in [1], and as will shortly become evident in our more general context, any




For ease of exposition, we shall from now on refer only to costs, with the explicit
understanding that when a cost γ < 0 (or, γ > 0) it corresponds to a cost (or,
benefit) in the colloquial sense.
Then the problem arises: how “should”the total cost, of all facilities, be allocated
amongst N?
An intuitive solution comes almost unbidden to the mind: at any facility, allocate
its cost equally among all its (identical) users.
It turns out that this solution coincides with the Shapley value of v and thus
serves to define the value on the domain of all characteristic functions.2
Worthy of note is the fact that the intuitive solution emerges just from the as-
signment, without any consideration of coalitions in N , leave aside a characteristic
function on N.
One may (if of a scholastic turn of mind) explicate two principles behind the
intuition, both so compelling as to require little justification. The first embodies a
form of decentralization: the cost allocation at any facility does not depend on what
is happening at other facilities (i.e., who goes to them, what their costs are, even how
many of them there are, etc.; it is “independent of irrelevant information”regarding
such externalities). The upshot is that, at any facility, those who do not use it may
simply be ignored (indeed, they are literally non-existent from the standpoint of the
facility, since they do not even come to it).
The second principle embodies a form of non-discrimination: at any facility, users
who are identical must be treated in the same manner, i.e., they must be allocated
the same costs.
2 The Assignment
Let N denote a finite set of users and K a finite set of facilities. Each user n ∈ N is
assigned a nonempty subset ψ(n) ⊆ K of facilities that he must use; and each facility
k ∈ K is assigned a cost γ(k) ∈ R that accrues to its users. ( Here R denotes the
reals; and the fact that γ(k) depends only on k, not on the person who is using k, is
tantamount to the assumption that all the users of k are identical at k .)
The pair (ψ, γ) will be called an assignment. In what follows, N will be fixed,
while K,ψ, γ are allowed to vary in order to generate different assignments. (One
may view (ψ, γ) as a bipartite graph, with disjoint sets N,K; an edge (n, k) iff
k ∈ ψ(n); and cost γ(k) at each node k ∈ K.)
2It also serves to explain the Shapley value to those who are not of a mathematical turn of mind.
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Given the assignment (ψ, γ), the natural question arises: how “should”the total
cost
∑
k∈K γ(k) be allocated to N ? The intuitive solution, as was said, stipulates
that at any facility k, its cost γ(k) be equally divided among all its identical users.
Indeed, this solution was invariably given as being obvious, by a random assortment
of lay people that the author posed the question to – high school students, fashion
designers, actors, businessmen, politicians, et al. – all of them perfectly innocent
of game theory. Yet their solution was the “Shapley value” of the “characteristic
function”induced by (ψ, γ).
Let us recall the notion of a characteristic function. Denote by C = {T : T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅}
the set of coalitions in N. Let G be the Euclidean space whose axes are indexed by
the elements of C. A characteristic function v is vector in G (equivalently, a func-
tion v : C −→ R), with the interpretation that its component v (T ) represents the
payoff that coalition T can guarantee to its members. If v satisfies the condition
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) whenever S ∩ T = ∅, it is said to be superadditive. Our
analysis holds for every v ∈ G, superadditive or not, though it is conventional to
assume superadditivity.
We shall show below that any v ∈ G is induced by an assignment (ψ, γ) of the
kind we have described; in our parlance, v is represented by the assignment (ψ, γ).
Assuming this for now, let us invoke the long forgotten “Axiom I” from Shapley’s
1951 working paper[3] (where “value”refers to the allocation of the total cost among
the players). It is important to first stress that the domain, on which the value is
sought to be defined in [3], does not consist of characteristic functions, but of what
we call “scenarios”below (and Shapley called3 “games”in [3]).4
Axiom I: The (Shapley) value (in any scenario) depends only on the
characteristic function v (that the scenario induces).
In light of this axiom, and our result that all characteristic functions on N can be
represented by assignments, the intuitive solution (endorsed by our game-theoretic
laity) determines the Shapley value on all scenarios (and of course – without the
need for this axiom – on characteristic functions). See Section 7 for more details.
Axiom I seems to have sunk into the subconscious of the subject, and indeed
the value is routinely taken to depend on v by definition (as is the case even in a
subsequent version [4] of [3]). However the axiom does have significant content, which
3However, since characteristic functions have subsequently come to be commonly called “trans-
ferable utility (TU) games”, we use the term “scenarios”to prevent confusion.
4Scenarios constitute “representations”of the characteristic function they induce, even though
they remained in the wings in [3] and only the characteristic function needed to be brought onto
the stage.
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is what presumably had led Shapley to state it in the first place. It calls attention
to the fact that that, in different scenarios Γ1,Γ2, . . . , the value does not depend on
the finer economic or engineering structure of the scenario, but only on its emergent
“financial structure”, i.e., on its characteristic function v. (To put it differently: for
purposes of cost allocation, what matters are the costs incurred by coalitions, never
mind how they incurred it.) This opens up the possibility of reversing the gaze:
rather than go from a scenario Γ to the characteristic function v that Γ induces, and
then figure out the value to players in v, one could instead start with v and conjure
up a special scenario Γ∗ which represents v and in which the value is intuitively
obvious.
3 The Characteristic Function Induced by an As-
signment
Recall C = {T : T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅} is the set of coalitions in N. For any coalition S ∈ C,
let ψ(S) = ∪n∈Sψ(n) denote the set of facilities assigned to users in S, and let v(S)





This defines the characteristic function (or, TU-game) v induced by (ψ, γ) .
4 The Representation of a Characteristic Func-
tion by an Assignment
Definition 1 We say that the assignment (ψ, γ) is a representation of the charac-
teristic function v if v is induced by (ψ, γ) .
Definition 2 For any assignment (ψ, γ) , let |ψ−1 (k)| denote the cardinality of the
set ψ−1 (k) = {n ∈ N : k ∈ ψ (n)}. The intuitive solution to (ψ, γ) is given by






Theorem 3 Let v ∈ G be any characteristic function. There exists a representa-
tion of v by an assignment (ψ, γ) . Moreover, for any assignment (ψ′, γ′) that is a
representation of v, the intuitive solution τ (ψ′, γ′) is the Shapley value of v.
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Proof. Denote C∗= {S ⊆ N : S 6= N} (notice ∅ ∈ C), and for any S ∈ C∗ define
wS ∈ G by
wS(T ) = 0 if T ⊆ S , and wS(T ) = 1 otherwise
We claim that the 2n − 1 vectors W = {wS : S ∈ C∗} form a basis for G. To see
this, first define uS ∈ G for any S ∈ C, by
uS(T ) = 1 if T = S, and uS(T ) = 0 otherwise
i.e., {uS : S ∈ C} is the standard basis of G consisting of the unit vectors. It
suffi ces to show that each uS ∈ Span W . We do so by induction on the cardinality s
of S. First let s = 1. Then S = {i} for some i ∈ N, and clearly
u{i} = w∅ − w{i} ∈ Span W
Next assume uS ∈ Span W for s = 1, . . . , k. Let S have cardinality k + 1 and let
S1, . . . , Sl denote all the strict subsets of S. Consider
w∗ = w∅ − wS
In w∗ observe that S and its strict subsets get 1, and all other coalitions get 0.
Therefore
uS = w
∗ − uS1 − . . .− uSl
Note w∗ ∈ SpanW by the second-last display, and uSj ∈ SpanW for j = 1, . . . , l
by the inductive asssumption (since the cardinality of each Sj is k or less). Hence
the last display implies that uS ∈ Span W . This establishes the claim.





Let the set K of facilities correspond to C∗ and define the assignment (ψ, γ) as
follows5:
ψ(n) = {S ∈ C∗ : n /∈ S} , for n ∈ N ;
and
γ(S) = cS, for S ∈ C∗.
5If cS = 0, one could of course drop facility S.
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It is readily verified that (ψ, γ) represents v. Indeed, by the linear expression for










Since the users in T are linked by ψ to precisely those facilities in S ∈ C∗ such
that T * S (see the fourth last display), i.e., ψ(T ) = {S ∈ C∗ : T * S} , it follows
that (ψ, γ) represents v.
Next let ϕ : G −→ RN denote the Shapley value, and let (ψ′, γ′) be any repre-
sentation of v ∈ G with K ′ as its underlying set of facilities. For any k ∈ K ′, define
the TU game vk ∈ G by
vk (T ) = γ
′(k) if k ∈ ψ′(T ); and vk (T ) = 0 otherwise
where (recall) ψ′(T ) = ∪n∈Tψ′(n). Then, from the fact that (ψ′, γ′) represents v,





Thus we have ϕ(v) =
∑
k∈K′ ϕ(vk) by the additivity of ϕ. But, in the TU game
vk, all the players in Tk = {n ∈ N : k /∈ ψ′(n)} are dummies and all the players in
N\Tk are symmetric. Hence ϕ(vk) awards 0 to players in Tk, and divides the total
vk(N) = γ
′(k) equally among the players in N\Tk (using the dummy, symmetry and
effi ciency properties of ϕ). This implies that ϕ(v) is the intuitive solution τ (ψ′, γ′) .
5 A Narrative for the Assignment
We present here a narrative that elaborates on how a characteristic function v is
induced by an assignment (ψ, γ) in accordance with our definition. For simplicity,
let us focus on the case where the induced v is superadditive (this is an implied
restriction on pairs (ψ, γ) .)
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Assume first that each n ∈ N must use facilities in ψ(n) — no more and no
less — otherwise a huge penalty (say, −∞) is levied on n. Next assume that the
only way for a user to obtain access to facilities is for him to be part of a coalition
which registers itself with a central authority (coalitions can be singletons). Once a
coalition S registers, the authority allocates to S an “industrial park”, indexed by S,
at which only the members of S are allowed to enter and at which precisely all the
facilities in ψ(S) are available (along with their attendant costs given by γ). Now a
little reflection reveals that the best that S can guarantee to itself, is to go as a block
to the authority, since there is no incentive for S to split into smaller subsets (on
account of superadditivity), and since one of the many courses of actions (rational
or not) available to those in N\S is to go off on their own. (By going as a block, S
incurs the cost v(S) =
∑
k∈ψ(S) γ(k); while by going off, N\S can ensure that S does
no better.)
When v is not superadditive, one might need to strengthen the narrative, and
further assume that once players enter any park S they can never leave it, or interact
in any way with others outside of the park. (We skip the details.)
The point is not whether the above narrative is realistic or interesting. It may
not even be happening on earth but on some other (to our prejudiced minds) wierd
planet. All that matters is that the narrative be logically coherent, with no in-
ternal contradictions, and that the numbers v(S) be well-defined for every S ∈ C,
compatible with the interpretation
v(S) = maximum payoff that S can guarantee itself, no matter what players in N\S do
We admit any such narrative in (ψ, γ) as a scenario in the domain to which Axiom
1 applies.
6 Equivalent Assignments
Our analysis implies that the intuitive solution (which may be summed up in the
simple phrase “equal division, facility-by-facility”) is invariant across different assign-
ments (ψ, γ) , (ψ′, γ′) , (ψ′′, γ′′) , . . . , provided that these assignments are representa-
tions of the same v. This may be of some independent interest in network analysis.6
6I owe this observation to John Geanakoplos.
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7 An Axiomatic Framework
Let S be an abstractly given set of “scenarios”on player-set N. Here by a scenario
we mean any interaction among the players, in which it is clear how to define the
amounts v(S) that coalitions S ∈ C can guarantee to their members (see Section 5).
For our purposes, it is not necessary to be more specific.
Further, let A denote the set of all assignment scenarios on N as defined earlier;
and recall that τ : A −→ RN denotes the intuitive solution on A.
Finally let θ : S −→ RN be a payoff map to the players as in [3].
Axiom II: A ⊂ S and θ coincides with τ on A.
In other words, the domain of θ is rich enough to include every assignment, and
on each assignment it prescribes the intuitive solution. Our theorem may then be
restated: the unique map θ which satisfies Axioms I and II is the Shapley value.
As was pointed out, Axiom II can be split into two parts, requiring θ to satisfy
decentralization and non-discrimination. Also note that Axiom I is only needed if S
extends beyond A.7
8 Related Literature
By way of a concrete instance of the assignment (ψ, γ), think of N as a set of
identical planes, and of ψ(n) as the set of cities that plane n must fly to.8 If γ(k) <
0, it represents the cost of building the runway at city k (a runway, once built,
accomodates any number of planes since they are of identical make); and if γ(k) > 0,
one may think of it as a “subsidy”given by city k (collectively to the planes that
visit its remote location). (If γ(k) = 0, city k can be dropped from the picture.)
These costs (benefits) may vary across cities on account of different costs of labor,
land, location, etc.
This picture is based on [2], which focused attention on a single airport used by
different-sized planes; and on [1] which observed that the model of [2] can be recast
with identical-sized planes that have different flight paths among multiple airports.
However the analysis in [1] (as in [2]) was restricted to the case of costs γ(k) < 0,
which severely limited the class of characteristic functions that could be generated.
The fact was missed in [1] that, by letting γ(k) take on arbitrary values in R, one
can generate all possible characteristic functions.
7This section was prompted by a query from Ori Haimanko.
8The daily flight path of each plane is a loop which traverses the cities in ψ(n) (in any order),
taking off and landing at each city in ψ(n) exactly once.
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